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The Scandal of ReasonA Critical Theory of Political Judgment$
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Albena Azmanova

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780231153805

Published to Columbia Scholarship Online: November 2015

DOI: 10.7312/columbia/9780231153805.001.0001

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Philosophical Liberalism

Philosophical Liberalism

Reasonable Judgment

Chapter:
(p.65) Chapter 3 Philosophical Liberalism
Source:
The Scandal of Reason
Author(s):

Albena Azmanova

Publisher:
Columbia University Press
DOI:10.7312/columbia/9780231153805.003.0004

This chapter looks at the contribution and limitations of Rawls' theory of justice in solving the problem of a politically relevant moral theory (the judgment paradox). Rawls uses for this a liberal version of the standard normative model characterized by an opposition between, on the one hand, a plurality of ethical standards and, on the other, universal moral norms. It demonstrates that, although Rawls attempts to go beyond this model by adding the hermeneutic dimension of an “overlapping consensus,” he stays confined to it. The chapter outlines the elements of the normative model implicit in Rawls' theory of justice and then shows how Rawls is both aware of the necessity of an additional normative level and reticent to develop it.

Keywords:   John Rawls, political judgment, political philosophy, justice theory, normative model, ethical standards, moral theory

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