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Under SiegePLO Decisionmaking During the 1982 War$
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Rashid Khalidi

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780231166690

Published to Columbia Scholarship Online: November 2015

DOI: 10.7312/columbia/9780231166690.001.0001

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Wartime Decisions and Their Consequences

Wartime Decisions and Their Consequences

(p.167) Chapter 6 Wartime Decisions and Their Consequences
Under Siege

Rashid Khalidi

Columbia University Press

This concluding chapter discusses the aftermath of the 1982 war, focusing on the extent of U.S. responsibility for the Sabra/Shatila massacres, on the basis of its commitments to the P.L.O. These included both provisions contained in the published evacuation agreement, and others worked out in the course of secret contacts. In all the attention devoted to the responsibility of Israel, the Phalangists, and the Lebanese state for the massacres, the role of the U.S. was largely ignored. The telex correspondence on this matter, together with other documents, show that this tragedy could have been prevented, had repeated explicit P.L.O. warnings been heeded by the United States.

Keywords:   1982 war, Sabra/Shatila massacres, Israel, United States, P.L.O. warnings, Lebanon, Phalangists, evacuation agreement

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