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Too Little, Too LateThe Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises$
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Martin Guzman, José Antonio Ocampo, and Joseph E. Stiglitz

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780231179263

Published to Columbia Scholarship Online: January 2017

DOI: 10.7312/columbia/9780231179263.001.0001

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Sovereign Debt Restructuring

Sovereign Debt Restructuring

A Coasean Perspective

Chapter:
(p.163) Chapter 8 Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Source:
Too Little, Too Late
Author(s):

James A. Haley

Publisher:
Columbia University Press
DOI:10.7312/columbia/9780231179263.003.0009

The chapter points to the importance of creditor committees for achieving successful sovereign debt restructurings. He claims that a more widespread utilization of creditor committees would minimize the holdout problems, as they would facilitate inter-creditors consensus, as most creditors will usually feel they can trust “a group of their own” more readily than they can trust the issuer.

Keywords:   Creditor Committees, Sovereign Debt Restructuring

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