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This volume offers alternative models for assessing the challenges of a nuclear Iran for U.S. security. It is based on the assumption that Iran will soon obtain nuclear weapons. Through three different scenarios, the book explores the political, strategic, and operational challenges facing the United States in a post-Cold War world. It assesses the type of nuclear capability Iran might develop and the conditions under which Iran might resort to threatening or actually to using such weapons. It looks at the extent to which Iran's military strategy and declaratory policy might embolden Iran and its proxies to pursue more aggressive policies in the region and vis-à-vis the United States. It also assesses Iran's ability to transfer nuclear materials to others within and outside the region, which might spark a nuclear cascade. Drawing on recent post-Cold War deterrence theory, it considers Iran's nuclear ambitions as they relate to its foreign policy objectives, domestic politics and role in the Islamic world. It also suggests specific approaches to improve U.S. defense and deterrence planning.

This book provides a detailed account of the British army's involvement in the Basra and Helmand campaigns. It looks at the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, and exposes a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. The book recounts how the British military, long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, has encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. It shows how, in its effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, the British army has failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume provides an assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. It calls attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by under-governed spaces. It underscores the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.

This book provides an effective framework for analyzing al-Qaeda's plans against America and encourages strategists and researchers to devote greater attention to jihadi ideas rather than jihadist military operations. It constructs a counter narrative to the West's supposed “war on Islam,” finding that jihadist terrorism strategy has more in common with the principles of Maoist guerrilla warfare than mainstream Islam. The book examines the Salafist roots of al-Qaeda ideology and the contributions of its most famous founders, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. It also looks at the Arabic-language works of lesser known theoreticians who have played an instrumental role in framing al-Qaeda's so-called war of the oppressed. It shows that these authors readily cite the guerrilla strategies of Mao, Che Guevara, and the mastermind of the Vietnam War, General Giap, and also shows that they incorporate the arguments of American theorists writing on “fourth-generation warfare.” The book argues that al-Qaeda's political-military strategy is a revolutionary and largely secular departure from the classic Muslim conception of jihad. In this way, the book adds new dimensions to the operational, psychological, and informational strategies already deployed by America's military in the region.

Since 2007, the German jihadist scene has become Europe's most dynamic, characterized by an extreme anti-Americanism, impressive international networks, and spectacularly effective propaganda. German jihadists travel to Turkey, Chechnya, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, trading jihadist ideologies and allying themselves with virulent organizations. Mapping the complicated interplay between jihadists' personal motivations and the goals and strategies of the world's major terrorist groups, the book provides the first analysis of German jihadism, its links to Turkey, and its growing, global operational importance. This book follows the formation of German-born militant networks in German cities and their radicalization and recruitment. It describes how these groups join al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as the Islamic Jihad Union, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Taliban, and it plots the path that directly involves them in terrorist activities. Situating these developments within a wider global context, the book interprets the expanding German scene as part of a greater internationalization of jihadist ideology and strategy, swelling the movement's membership since 9/11. Increasing numbers of Pakistanis, Afghans, Turks, Kurds, and European converts are coming to the aid of Arab al-Qaeda, an incremental integration that has worrisome implications for the national security of Germany, the United States, and their allies.

The treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison, Guantánamo Bay, and far-flung CIA "black sites" after the attacks of 9/11 included cruelty that defied legal and normative prohibitions in U.S. and international law. The anti-torture stance of the United States was brushed aside. Since then, the guarantee of American civil liberties and due process for POWs and detainees has grown muddled, threatening the norms that sustain modern democracies. How the Gloves Came Off considers the legal and political arguments that led to this standoff between civility and chaos and their significant consequences for the strategic interests and standing of the United States. Unpacking the rhetoric surrounding the push for unitary executive action in wartime, How the Gloves Came Off traces the unmaking of the consensus against torture. It implicates U.S. military commanders, high-level government administrators, lawyers, and policy makers from both parties, exposing the ease with which powerful actors manipulated ambiguities to strip detainees of their humanity. By targeting the language and logic that made torture thinkable, this book shows how future decision makers can craft an effective counter-narrative and set a new course for U.S. policy toward POWs and detainees. Whether leaders use their influence to reinforce a prohibition of cruelty to prisoners or continue to undermine long-standing international law will determine whether the United States retains a core component of its founding identity.

For decades after World War II, Japan chose to focus on soft power and economic diplomacy alongside a close alliance with the United States, eschewing a potential leadership role in regional and global security. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the rise of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan's military capabilities have resurged. In this analysis of Japan's changing military policy, Andrew L. Oros shows how a gradual awakening to new security challenges has culminated in the multifaceted "security renaissance" of the past decade. Despite openness to new approaches, however, three historical legacies—contested memories of the Pacific War and Imperial Japan, postwar anti-militarist convictions, and an unequal relationship with the United States—play an outsized role. In Japan's Security Renaissance Oros argues that Japan's future security policies will continue to be shaped by these legacies, which Japanese leaders have struggled to address. He argues that claims of rising nationalism in Japan are overstated, but there has been a discernable shift favoring the conservative Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party. Bringing together Japanese domestic politics with the broader geopolitical landscape of East Asia and the world, Japan's Security Renaissance provides guidance on this century's emerging international dynamics.

Defined as operations other than war, stability operations can include peacekeeping activities, population control, and counternarcotics efforts, and for the entire history of the United States military, they have been considered a dangerous distraction if not an outright drain on combat resources. Yet in 2005, the U.S. Department of Defense reversed its stance on these practices, a dramatic shift in the mission of the armed forces and their role in foreign and domestic affairs. With the elevation of stability operations, the job of the American armed forces is no longer just to win battles but to create a controlled, nonviolent space for political negotiations and accord. Yet rather than produce revolutionary outcomes, stability operations have resulted in a large-scale mission creep with harmful practical and strategic consequences. This book examines the military's sudden embrace of stability operations and its implications for American foreign policy and war. Through a detailed examination of deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, changes in U.S. military doctrine, adaptations in force preparation, and the political dynamics behind this new stance, the book connects the preference for stability operations to the far-reaching, overly ambitious American preoccupation with managing international stability. It also shows how domestic politics have reduced civilian agencies' capabilities while fostering an unhealthy overreliance on the military. Introducing new concepts such as securitized instability and institutional privileging, the book builds a framework for understanding and analyzing the expansion of the American armed forces' responsibilities in an ever-changing security landscape.

This book confronts the quest for security arising from the social, economic, environmental, and political crises and transformations of our century. It begins with an expansive, balanced analysis of the global landscape and the factors contributing to the growth of insecurity. Whereas earlier studies have touched on how globalization has increased economic insecurity and how geopolitical changes may have contributed to military insecurity, this volume looks for some common threads: in a globalized world without a global government, with a system of global governance not up to the task, how do we achieve security without looking inward and stepping back from globalization? Chapters seek answers to questions about how we achieve protection of those people who are most insecure without resorting to economic, military, or mafia protectionism. Some have suggested that the turmoil in the Eurozone “proves” the deficiencies in the welfare state. This book argues that the superior performance of Scandinavian countries arises from their superior systems of social protection, which allow their citizens to undertake greater risk and more actively participate in globalization. Some suggest that we can address terrorism or transnational crimes through the strengthening of borders or long-distance wars. This book develops the proposition that such approaches have the opposite effect and that only through spreading the human security experienced in well-ordered societies can these dangers be managed. This book also examines how these global changes play out, not only in the relations among countries and the management of globalization, but at every level of our society, especially in our cities. It explores the potential for cities to ensure personal security, promote political participation, and protect the environment in the face of increasing urbanization.

Despite China's effort to maintain peace with its neighbors, its military and economic growth poses an undeniable threat. Regional states must account for a more powerful potential adversary in China, and China has become more ambitious in its efforts to control its surroundings. Historical baggage has only aggravated the situation as China believes it is reclaiming its rightful place after a time of weakness and mistreatment, and other Asia-Pacific countries remember all too well their encounter with Chinese conflict and domination. This book examines the benefits and consequences of a more politically, economically, and militarily potent China. Since China's intended sphere of influence encroaches on the autonomy of regional states, its attempts to increase its own security have weakened the security of its neighbors. Nevertheless, there is little incentive for Beijing to change a status quo that is mostly good for China, and the People's Republic of China thrives through its participation in the global economy and multilateral institutions. Even so, Beijing remains extremely sensitive to challenges to the Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy and believes it is entitled to exercise influence on its periphery. On these issues, nationalism trumps any reluctance to upset the international system. Diplomatic disputes regarding the islands in the South China Sea, as well as controversial relations with North Korea, continue to undermine Chinese promises of positive behavior. The book reveals the dynamics defining this volatile region, in which governments pursue China as an economic partner yet fear Beijing's power to set the rules of engagement.

China has developed sophisticated hedging strategies to insure against risks in the international petroleum market. It has managed a growing net oil import gap and supply disruptions by maintaining a favorable energy mix, pursuing overseas equity oil production, building a state-owned tanker fleet and strategic petroleum reserve, establishing cross-border pipelines, and diversifying its energy resources and routes. Though it cannot be “secured,” China’s energy security can be “insured” by marrying government concern with commercial initiatives. This book analyzes China’s domestic, global, maritime, and continental petroleum strategies and policies, establishing a new theoretical framework that captures the interrelationship between security and profit. Arguing that hedging is central to China’s energy-security policy, this volume links government concerns about security of supply to energy companies’ search for profits, and by drawing important distinctions between threats and risks, peacetime and wartime contingencies, and pipeline and seaborne energy-supply routes, the study shifts scholarly focus away from securing and toward insuring an adequate oil supply and from controlling toward managing any disruptions to the sea lines of communication.

When the photographs depicting torture at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison were released in 2004, U.S. politicians attributed the incident to a few bad apples in the U.S. military, exonerated high-ranking members of the George W. Bush administration, promoted Guantánamo as a model prison, and dismissed the illegality of the CIA's use of “enhanced interrogation.” By the end of the Bush administration, members of both major congressional parties had come to denounce enhanced interrogation as torture and argue for the closing of Guantánamo. What initiated this shift? This book reviews transcripts from congressional hearings and scholarship on denial, torture, and state violence to document this wholesale change in rhetoric and attitude toward the use of torture by the CIA and the U.S. military during the War on Terror. It plots the evolution of the “torture issue” in U.S. politics and its manipulation by politicians to serve various ends. Most important, it integrates into the debate about torture the testimony of those who suffered under American interrogation practices and demonstrates how the conversation continues to influence current counterterrorism policies, such as the reliance on drones.