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Brains, Buddhas, and BelievingThe Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind$
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Dan Arnold

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780231145473

Published to Columbia Scholarship Online: November 2015

DOI: 10.7312/columbia/9780231145473.001.0001

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Dharmakīrti’s Proof of Rebirth

Dharmakīrti’s Proof of Rebirth

A Dualist Account of the Causes of Cognition

(p.19) 1 Dharmakīrti’s Proof of Rebirth
Brains, Buddhas, and Believing

Dan Arnold

Columbia University Press

This chapter considers Dharmakīrti's critique of physicalism in the Pramāṇavārttika, or “Critical Commentary on Epistemic Criteria.” It begins with a general survey of some central commitments of Dharmakīrti; in particular, it sketches the basics of his epistemology, focused in terms of the causally describable character of perception. It then determines what kind of argument against physicalism is available to Dharmakīrti in light of these commitments. His argument is that mental items are ontologically distinct from physical items—and that this is compatible with Dharmakīrti's characteristically Ābhidharmika notions of causation. The chapter characterizes his argument as basically empiricist in character, in a sense to be elaborated.

Keywords:   Dharmakīrti, Buddhism, physicalism, Pramāṇavārttika, perception, Ābhidharmika, causation

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