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Brains, Buddhas, and BelievingThe Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind$
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Dan Arnold

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780231145473

Published to Columbia Scholarship Online: November 2015

DOI: 10.7312/columbia/9780231145473.001.0001

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Responsiveness to Reasons as Such

Responsiveness to Reasons as Such

A Kantian Account of Intentionality

Chapter:
(p.81) 3 Responsiveness to Reasons as Such
Source:
Brains, Buddhas, and Believing
Author(s):

Dan Arnold

Publisher:
Columbia University Press
DOI:10.7312/columbia/9780231145473.003.0003

This chapter presents a Kantian account of why concerns to do with language should figure prominently in philosophy of mind. Chief among the Kantian arguments to be elaborated is that the intentionality of awareness constitutively involves this conceptual space, and that we must, to that extent, suppose that intentionality cannot be exhaustively explained in causal terms. The argument is completed by pressing the point that the foregoing conclusion cannot be denied insofar as it is only by reasoning that one could do so; the cognitivist project of “naturalizing” intentionality cannot go through, then, just insofar as we can make sense of anyone's being persuaded of any view on the matter.

Keywords:   intentionality, mental causation, reason, Kant, philosophy of mind, naturalizing, language

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