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Brains, Buddhas, and BelievingThe Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind$
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Dan Arnold

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780231145473

Published to Columbia Scholarship Online: November 2015

DOI: 10.7312/columbia/9780231145473.001.0001

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(p.1) Introduction
Brains, Buddhas, and Believing

Dan Arnold

Columbia University Press

This introductory chapter sets out the book's purpose, which is to look at what was arguably the dominant trajectory of Indian Buddhist philosophy—that stemming from Dharmakīrti (c.600–660 ce)—through the lens of central issues in contemporary philosophy of mind. It suggests that there are indeed important respects in which Dharmakīrti's project is akin to those of contemporary cognitive-scientific philosophers, including a guiding commitment to finally causal explanations of the mental, as well as the view that everything about the mental must be explicable with reference only to things somehow internal to the subject. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.

Keywords:   Dharmakīrti, Buddhism, Indian Buddhists, philosophy of mind, cognitive-scientific philosophers, mental

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