This book looks at the conflict between two very different understandings of identity: the more traditional view that an identity carries with it certain duties and obligations, and an opposing view in which there can be no rationally compelling move from statements of fact to “judgments of value.” According to this second view, individuals must take responsibility for determining their own values and obligations. The book illustrates through personal experience the practical implications of this characteristically philosophical debate. It finally settles on the following answer: both the “tra ... More

This book looks at the conflict between two very different understandings of identity: the more traditional view that an identity carries with it certain duties and obligations, and an opposing view in which there can be no rationally compelling move from statements of fact to “judgments of value.” According to this second view, individuals must take responsibility for determining their own values and obligations. The book illustrates through personal experience the practical implications of this characteristically philosophical debate. It finally settles on the following answer: both the “traditional” assumption that individuals must recognize certain values and obligations, and the contrary view that individuals are ultimately responsible for determining their own values, are deeply embedded in differing conceptions of society and its relation to its members. The book also examines the misunderstandings between those for whom identity constitutes a conceptual bridge connecting the facts of who and what a person may be to the value commitments incumbent upon them, and those for whom the very idea of such a bridge can be nothing but a confusion. Using key examples from the notoriously vexed case of Jewish identity, the book depicts the practical significance of the differences between these worldviews, particularly for those who have to negotiate them.