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Counterinsurgency in CrisisBritain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare$
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David Ucko and Robert Egnell

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780231164276

Published to Columbia Scholarship Online: November 2015

DOI: 10.7312/columbia/9780231164276.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM COLUMBIA SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.columbia.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright University of Minnesota Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in CUPSO for personal use.date: 15 May 2021

Introduction

Introduction

Rethinking Counterinsurgency

Chapter:
(p.1) Introduction
Source:
Counterinsurgency in Crisis
Author(s):

David H. Ucko

Robert Egnell

Publisher:
Columbia University Press
DOI:10.7312/columbia/9780231164276.003.0007

This introductory chapter discusses British counterinsurgency theory and counterinsurgency in general. The legacy of the British armed forces with counterinsurgency has been forgotten since the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan broke out. In these instances, serious difficulties owing to confusion regarding the mission's purpose, a flawed intelligence picture, deficiencies in troop levels, as well as various operational and tactical mistakes troubled the well-founded military strategies of the British armed forces. The study aims to decipher what accounted for this operational frustration. It asks questions about the validity of historical British counterinsurgency principles at the time and what measures they used to address the problem. It also looks at the implications of the operational frustration on Britain's role in international peace and security. The chapter then frames the entire study within these aspects, namely, the definition and use of counterinsurgency, as well as the roles of learning, adaptation, and political will.

Keywords:   British counterinsurgency theory, counterinsurgency, British armed forces, Iraq, Afghanistan, operational frustration, political will, Britain

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